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INTRODUCTION
On September 29, 2015, Governor of the Bank of England Mark Carney
delivered a major policy address to UK insurers gathered for a black-tie event at
Lloyds of London in the City of London. Entitled “Breaking the Tragedy of the
Horizon,” Mr. Carney’s after-dinner talk eschewed the usual conventions of humor
and reasonably light fare to discuss the challenges facing the world from climate
change.1 While recognizing global risks to property, political stability and food and
water security from climate change, the speech concentrated on three categories of

* Cynthia Williams is Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School.
1. Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of England, Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon: Climate Change
and Financial Stability, Address at Lloyd’s of London City Dinner (Sept. 29, 2015), http://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/speech844.pdf. Mr. Carney entitles
the risks from climate change a “tragedy of the horizon” since the most serious consequences of today’s
emissions will eventuate beyond the time-frame of today’s business cycles, political cycles and regulatory
cycles, which are at maximum ten years.
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financial stability risks: those caused by the physical changes induced by climate
change; liability risks if “extractors and emitters” and/or their officers and directors
were to be held liable for the negative effects of their products; and financial risks
from the transition to a low-carbon economy. This latter category includes the risk
of the value of “stranded [oil, gas and coal] assets” on the balance sheets of banks,
insurance companies and pension funds being rapidly re-priced downward; and the
potential that “an abrupt resolution of the tragedy of the horizons is itself a financial
stability risk.”2
Having laid out an imposing scenario, Mr. Carney then suggested that better
information would help “the market itself to adjust efficiently,” in a situation where
multiple parameters will “influence the speed of transition to a low-carbon
economy,” including public policy, technology, investor preferences and physical
events.3 One approach Mr. Carney said the Financial Stability Board (FSB) was
considering was to ask the G20 “to establish an industry-led group, a Climate
Disclosure Task Force, to design and deliver a voluntary standard for disclosure by
those companies that produce or emit carbon.”4 By having access to information
about the carbon intensity of goods and services, investors can then “assess risks to
companies’ business models and . . . express their views in the market.”5 This
information can also inform policy makers, who could “learn from markets’
reactions and refine their stance, with better information allowing more informed
reactions, and supporting better policy decisions including on targets and
instruments.”6
Mr. Carney recognized that information on carbon emissions is not lacking in
the market: indeed, he stated that there are “nearly 400 initiatives”7 that suggest or
require the disclosure of companies’ greenhouse gas emissions or environmental
data. Still, with more consistent, comparable, reliable, clear and efficient information
about companies’ current emissions and the strategies companies plan to employ in
their transition to the “net-zero world of the future,”8 he asserted that both markets
and government would have better tools to manage the transition to a low-carbon
economy. The efficacy of these tools could be amplified by government “giving
guidance on possible carbon price paths,” a so-called “price corridor,” plus stress
testing to determine “the skews from climate change to the returns of various
businesses.”9 But generally Mr. Carney has faith that by “managing what gets
measured, we can break the Tragedy of the Horizon.”10

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 11, 12.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
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In his view of markets being able to adapt and lead the transition to a lowcarbon future if given appropriate information, albeit recognizing the importance
of a supportive policy environment and with technological advances, Mr. Carney
unwittingly joins social responsibility activists and socially responsible investors who
for at least two decades have promoted disclosure and transparency as important
levers for changing corporate behavior. Transnational, voluntary disclosure regimes
for producing expanded environmental, social and governance (ESG) information,
such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) or the Carbon Disclosure Project
(CDP), have proliferated, as have some government requirements for such
disclosure, as discussed below. Yet these developments occur as automated trading
replaces the kind of contextual, information-based trading that ESG disclosure
might affect for a significant percentage of trades in the market;11 and as global
emissions continue to rise, notwithstanding voluntary greenhouse gas (GHG)
disclosure by five-thousand of the world’s largest operating companies using the
CDP framework.12 Thus, how powerful a mechanism voluntary disclosure is or can
be for producing operational changes within companies, and how effective selfregulatory or multi-stakeholder corporate responsibility initiatives generally can be
are both questions that bear further exploration. Given how ubiquitous disclosure
and self-regulation have become in the transnational business context, this essay will
start that exploration, while recognizing that each question deserves more
substantial treatment than will be attempted here.
In this essay, the Author provides an overview in Part I of some initiatives to
require or encourage companies to produce specific ESG data, authored both by
governments and by private standard-setters. In Part II, one disclosure initiative in

11.
Estimates of the percentage of trades that are computer generated vary between 39%
(Europe) and 51% (U.S.) in one report, WORLD FED’N OF EXCHS., UNDERSTANDING HIGH
FREQUENCY TRADING (2012), http://www.world-exchanges.org/home/index.php/files/23/Position
%20Papers%20%20Educational%20Materials/71/Understanding%20High%20Frequency%20Tradin
g%20(HFT).pdf, but other estimates suggest between 50% and 70% of all equities trades by volume
are computer generated. See Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, UCLA L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (citing STAFF OF THE DIV. OF TRADING AND MKTS., U.S. SECS. AND EXCH.
COMM’N, EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE LITERATURE REVIEW: PART II: HIGH FREQUENCY
TRADING, 4-7 (2014), https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/hft_lit_review_march_2014
.pdf). Regulators generally agree there are no good data on the phenomenon. Of course, automated
trading relies upon information, but this is primarily financial information and trading trends, and not
the expanded qualitative and quantitative ESG data that corporate accountability advocates promote or
that GRI produces.
12.
See, e.g., JOHN MOORHEAD & TIM NIXON, GLOBAL 500 GREENHOUSE GASES
PERFORMANCE 2010-2013: 2014 REPORT ON TRENDS, 3 (Thomson Reuters, 2014) (finding that
greenhouse gas emissions by the top 500 global companies rose 3.1% from 2010 through 2013, whereas
they should have decreased by 4.2% during that same period for the world to have a likely probability
of staying under a 2 degree Celsius rise in global average temperatures). The key question to investigate
is whether emissions have stabilized or gone down/per unit of revenue, for the 5,000 firms producing
information to CDP. The variety in formats for CDP disclosure makes answering that question difficult.
See Ans Kolk, David Levy & Jonatan Pinkse, Corporate Responses in an Emerging Climate Regime: The
Institutionalization and Commensuration of Carbon Disclosure. 17(4) EUR. ACCT. REV. 719, 721 (2008)
(concluding that voluntary carbon disclosure to CDP “remains inconsistent and difficult to interpret.”).
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particular will be discussed as an example of a transnational legal order (TLO), as
defined by Professors Shaffer and Halliday,13 and that is the Global Reporting
Initiative, which has become the benchmark corporate social disclosure framework.
Part III identifies a number of significant questions about our knowledge of the real
power of information strategies to change corporate behavior, as the GRI seeks to
do, as well as questions about the efficacy of self-regulation generally.
Part IV then asserts that the “legality” aspect is a centrally-important element
of the TLO framework advanced by Shaffer and Halliday. Particularly regarding
transnational corporate responsibility, reliance has been placed almost exclusively
on “new governance” initiatives, which are generally non-binding, voluntary,
collaboratively developed standards for responsible behavior. New governance
standards have fascinated academics from a wide range of fields, including this
author, leading to an explosion of literature on the cognate topics over the last ten
to fifteen years.14 Yet, during this same period of time, Bi-lateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) and free-trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), have been negotiated throughout the world. These treaties
generally permit private companies to challenge any government action—legislative,
regulatory, or judicial—that is alleged to reduce the company’s future profits.15
These challenges are heard by private arbitrators and are not subject to judicial
review.
The contrast is stark between new governance forms of collaborative, often
industry-led, voluntary standards for responsible action, and the limits on sovereign
regulatory authority being developed as a result of the expansion of the investorstate system for arbitration pursuant to BITs and trade agreements, leading this
author to remember the line in the movie the Wizard of Oz: “pay no attention to the
man behind the curtain.” To badly mix literary references, we may have fixed our
collective attention on the construction of a transnational regulatory Potemkin
village even as the man behind the curtain progressively undermines the capacity of
the strong form of regulation, that of sovereign domestic law. It is in emphasizing
the importance of legality and how transnational norms “touch down” in binding
processes, court proceedings, contracts, or public proceedings that Shaffer and
Halliday’s theory of Transnational Legal Orders reorients our thinking in a
productive, and important, direction.16 Part V concludes.

13.
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, eds.,
Cambridge University Press 2015).
14. See Part IV, footnotes 73 to 95, 101 to 111 for some of the standard references introducing
this literature.
15. See GUS VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES AND SOVEREIGN CONSTRAINTS (Oxford
University Press 2013) for a thorough discussion of this problem [hereinafter VAN HARTEN,
SOVEREIGN CHOICES]. For a short introduction showing the expansion of investor-state arbitrations
since the 1990s see Gus Van Harten, Private Authority and Transnational Governance: The Contours of the
International System of Investor Protection, 12:4 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 600 (2005) [hereinafter Van Harten,
Private Authority].
16. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 13.
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I. TRENDS IN ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND GOVERNANCE REPORTING17
A. Voluntary ESG Reporting
Over the past two decades, corporate sustainability reporting has developed
from an academic idea in critical accounting to a global business practice.18 While
some jurisdictions are starting to require ESG reporting (as described below), much
of this reporting is still voluntary.
The most comprehensive source of data on ESG reporting is that done by
KPMG in the Netherlands. KPMG published its first ESG report in 1993, and its
most recent in 2013. In 1993, twelve percent of the top 100 companies in the
OECD countries (ex. Japan) published an environmental or social report.19 By 2013,
seventy-six percent of the top 100 companies in the Americas publish a separate
corporate responsibility report, as do seventy-three percent of top 100 companies
in Europe and seventy-one percent in Asia.20 Of the largest 250 companies globally,
reporting rates are ninety-three percent.21
The Global Reporting Initiative’s voluntary, multi-stakeholder framework for
ESG reporting has emerged as the clear global benchmark: seventy-eight percent of
reporting companies worldwide and eighty-two percent of the Global 250 use GRI
as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting.22 GRI’s development as a
Transnational Legal Order (TLO) will be discussed in more detail below. Slightly
over half (fifty-nine percent) of the Global 250 now have their reports “assured,”
most often (two-thirds of the time) by the specialist bureaus of the major
accountancy firms.23
In addition to the quantity of corporate responsibility reporting, KPMG also
evaluates the quality of reporting. Here, European companies generally do
substantially better than those in Asia or the Americas (average quality scores of
seventy-one out of 100 in Europe versus fifty-four for companies in the Americas
17.
Section I of this Article is based on portions of Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social
Responsibility and Corporate Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Georg Ringe, eds. Forthcoming March 2017).
18. For an excellent overview of the evolution of corporate responsibility as an academic theory
in the management literature, see Archie B. Carroll, Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional
Construct, 38 BUS. & SOC’Y 268 (1999).
19. See Ans Kolk, A Decade of Sustainability Reporting: Developments and Significance, 3 INT’L J. ENV’T
& SUSTAINABLE DEV. 51, 52 fig.1 (2004). KPMG has changed the format of the report since its original
1993 report on corporate responsibility reporting, so direct comparisons are not possible between the
Global 250 in 1993 and the Global 250 in 2013.
20. KPMG, The KPMG Survey of CR Reporting 2013, at 10, https://www.kpmg.com/Global/en
/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/corporate-responsibility/Documents/corporateresponsibility-reporting-survey-2013-exec-summary.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2015).
21. See id.
22. See id. at 11. The GRI is now in its fourth iteration. It has been developed by, and is used
by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around the world to report on the
economic, environmental, and social and governance effects of entities’ actions. See Global Reporting
Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org.
23. See KPMG, supra note 20, at 11.
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and fifty in Asia Pacific).24 Within the Global 250, companies are starting to see
more opportunities than risks from social and environmental factors, such as for
the development of new products and services. Eighty-seven percent of the Global
250 identify climate change, material resource scarcity and trends in energy and fuel
as “megatrends” that will affect their business.25 Ultimately KPMG concludes that
“[m]any companies no longer see corporate responsibility as a moral issue, but as
core business risks and opportunities.”26
B. Required Sustainability Reporting
By 2015, many European countries or their stock exchanges, and the EU itself,
require some environmental or social disclosure, to varying degrees of specificity.27
The EU’s requirement is a directive that entered into force on the sixth of
December 2014; member states will need to transpose it into national legislation
within two years.28 It will require approximately 6,000 large companies and “public
interest organizations,” such as banks and insurance companies, to “prepare a nonfinancial statement containing information relating to at least environmental
matters, social and employee-related matters, respect for human rights, anticorruption and bribery matters.”29 This requirement builds upon EU accounting
rules (the EU Accounts Modernization Directive) that have, since 2003, required
companies to report on environmental and labor issues “to the extent necessary” to
provide investors with an accurate view of the company’s financial position and the
risks to that position.30
In addition to the new EU non-financial disclosure requirements, the Nordic
countries have been leaders in requiring corporate reporting that is more
comprehensive than the reporting required by the EU’s 2003 Accounts
Modernization Directive. Since 2008, public companies in Sweden must make a
sustainability report consistent with GRI.31 Since January 2009, approximately 1,100

24. See id. at 14.
25. See id. at 14-15.
26. See id. at 15.
27. See Beate Sjåfjell & Linn Anker Sørensen, Directors’ Duties and Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR), 25-27, in BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN EUROPEAN COMPANIES: RESHAPING AND
HARMONISING THEIR ORGANISATION AND DUTIES (Hanne Birkmose, Mette Neville & Karsten
Engsig Sørensen eds. Kluwer Law Int’l 2013/2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2322680.
28. See Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October
2014, amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information
by certain large undertakings and groups, 2014 O.J. (L330) 1, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content
/en/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095.
29. See id. at ¶ 6.
30. See Sjåfjell & Sørensen, supra note 27, at 25, 35. For further discussion of the 2003 Accounts
Modernization Directive, see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path
of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the UK, 31:2 WM & MARY ENV. L.J. 317 (2007).
31. See JAN BERTIL ANDERSON & FRIDA SEGENMARK, SUSTAINABLE COMPANIES: BARRIERS
AND POSSIBILITIES IN SWEDISH COMPANY LAW (University of Oslo Res. Paper No. 2013-09 2013),
at 13, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2248584.
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large companies in Denmark, as well as institutional investors and loan providers,
have been required to publish an annual corporate responsibility report, following
a 2008 government Action Plan on Corporate Responsibility.32 Companies may use
their annual reporting to the U.N. Global Compact as the framework for their
public disclosure, and institutional investors may report on their incorporation of
the Principles of Responsible Investment (PRI) developed by the U.N.
Environment Programme.33 And as of 1 July 2013, Norwegian companies must
report on labor issues, gender equality, anti-discrimination and environmental
issues, including reporting on what they are doing to incorporate these issues and
human rights concerns into management practices.34
These examples are indicative of a global trend towards required corporate
responsibility reporting. According to a 2015 report by the Initiative for Responsible
Investment of the Hauser Institute for Civil Society at the Kennedy School, Harvard
University, twenty-two countries and the European Union have enacted legislation
within the last fifteen years to require public companies to issue reports including
environmental and/or social information.35 These countries include Argentina,
China, Denmark, the EU, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany Greece, Hungary,
India, Indonesia, Ireland (specific to state-supported financial institutions after the
2008 financial crisis), Italy, Japan, Malaysia, The Netherlands, Norway, South Africa,
Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and the U.K.36 Of these countries, France is particularly
noteworthy, having been a leader by requiring publicly-listed companies to report
data on forty labor and social criteria since 2002, followed by requirements in 2009
for companies with more than five-hundred employees in high-emitting sectors to
publish their greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions.37
In addition to these reporting initiatives, seven stock exchanges require social
and/or environmental disclosure as part of their listing requirements: Australia’s
ASX, Brazil’s Bovespa, India’s Securities and Exchange Board, the Bursa Malaysia,
Oslo’s Børs, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, and the London Stock Exchange.38
Moreover, seven countries have enacted policies following those of the U.K. and
Sweden, which since 2000 have required pension funds to disclose the extent to
which the fund incorporates social and environmental information into their

32. See Karin Buhmann, Company Law as an Agent for Migration of CR-Related International Law into
Company Self-Regulation? The Case of the CR Reporting Requirement, 8:2-3 EUR. COMPANY L. 65, 68 (2011).
33. See id. For more information on the PRI, see About the PRI, http://www.unpri.org/about.
34. See Sjåfjell & Sørensen, supra note 27, at 26-27.
35.
See Initiative for Responsible Investment, Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure Efforts by
National Governments and Stock Exchanges (March 12, 2015), http://hausercenter.org/iri/wp-content
/uploads/2015/04/CSR-3-27-15.pdf.
36. See id.
37. See id., citing the New Economic Regulations Act in France, 2002.
38. See id.
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investment decisions.39 These countries include Australia, Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, and Japan.40
II. THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE
A. Description
One particularly significant voluntary disclosure initiative is GRI. As stated
above, GRI’s voluntary framework for ESG reporting has emerged as the global
benchmark: eighty-two percent of the Global 250 companies use GRI as the basis
for their corporate responsibility reporting.41 And as of 2015, ninety-three percent
of the global 250 companies publish a stand-alone social report,42 so this is no longer
a fringe activity.
GRI is now in its fourth iteration, called G4, having begun in 1997 as a project
of two Boston-based NGOs that promote environmental transparency, and
supported from the beginning by the United Nations Environment Programme.43
The two founding NGOs were CERES, the Coalition of Environmentally
Responsible Economies, then led by Rev. Robert Massie, and the Tellus Institute,
of which GRI developed from a project initiated by Dr. Allen White.44 GRI soon
moved its headquarters to Amsterdam, and expanded its scope beyond
environmental reporting to social reporting as well. It has been developed by, and
is used by, thousands of companies, governments, and non-profit entities around
the world to report on the economic, environmental, social, and governance aspects
of their organization and actions.45
The goal of GRI is to provide a standard, high-quality framework for
organizations to use and adapt for purposes of their “triple bottom line” reporting,
which is reporting on their most “critical impacts—positive or negative—on the
environment, society and the economy.”46 The framework includes two parts:
“general standard disclosures” for all organizations, and “specific standard
disclosures” based on the industry and social and environmental risks and

39. For a discussion of this requirement in the U.K., and other early social and environmental
disclosure requirements, see Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way?: The Erosion
of the Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005) (arguing that
differences in the “shareholder wealth maximizing” norm between the U.K. and U.S. were substantial
enough to cast doubt on the idea of an “Anglo-American corporate governance” system).
40. See Initiative for Responsible Investment, supra note 35.
41. See KPMG, supra note 20, at 11.
42. See id. at 10.
43.
See “Our History” in GRI, GRI: EMPOWERING SUSTAINABLE DECISIONS, OUR FIVEYEAR FOCUS 2015-2020, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center
/Documents/GRI-Five-year-focus-2015.pdf.
44.
See David Levy, Halina S. Brown, & Martin de Jong, The Contested Politics of Corporate
Governance: The Case of the Global Reporting Initiative, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 88, (2010) (discussing role of Massie
and White in creating GRI).
45. See Global Reporting Initiative, http://www.globalreporting.org.
46. Id.
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opportunities in that particular industry. The general standard disclosures comprise
seven categories, those being “strategy and analysis; organizational profile; identified
material aspects and boundaries; stakeholder engagement; report profile;
governance; and ethics and integrity.”47 The specific standard disclosures include
Disclosure on Management’s Approach (DMA) to identifying and managing its
material Aspects; and then ninety-one potential indicators describing various social,
economic and environmental material Aspects that might be affected by a
company’s operations. Sector specific frameworks are being developed to identify
specific standard disclosures for airport operators; construction and real estate;
electric utilities; event organizers; financial services; food processing; media; mining
and metals; NGOs and oil and gas. New to G4, organizations are asked to identify
the boundaries they are using in defining the scope of reporting, recognizing that
the boundaries of an organization’s effects can be both within its organization and
outside of its organization, such as in its supply chain or in the communities where
it operates.
B. Analysis
In 2015, GRI articulated five premises that inform its work and strategy for
the subsequent five years. Those are:
“We believe:
• In the power of a multi-stakeholder process and inclusive network
• Transparency is a catalyst for change
• Our standards empower informed decision making
• A global perspective is needed to change the world
• Public interest should drive every decision an organization makes”48
That producing GRI reports has not necessarily led to more systematic
consideration of sustainability issues in corporations’ decision-making is implicit in
GRI’s observation as part of its five-year plan that it is now time to move beyond
reporting. As it states:
Our focus has always been on the reporting process and the value of the
information that comes from it. While the sustainability report remains a
crucial output of the reporting process, we must now move beyond the
report itself to ensure that decision makers have access to the high quality
and reliable information they are increasingly demanding . . . .
But for this information to truly empower sustainable decisions in every
organization, it must be more accessible, comparable and available in realtime.49
47.
See GRI, G4 FAQS, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/FAQs/G4FAQ
/Pages/default.aspx.
48.
See GRI, GRI: EMPOWERING SUSTAINABLE DECISIONS; OUR FIVE-YEAR FOCUS 20152020, https://www.globalreporting.org/information/news-and-press-center/Documents/GRI-Five
-year-focus-2015.pdf.
49. Id.
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While comparability of information has been an articulated goal for GRI’s
triple bottom line disclosure, just as it is for financial disclosure, in fact GRI’s
framework allows for quite non-comparable reports among organizations. This is
because organizations can choose to report in accordance with GRI’s G4
framework based on one of two options, just as they’ve been able to choose their
approach to reporting in prior versions of GRI. “Core” reporting requires a generic
DMA (Disclosure of Management’s Approach) and use of at least one indicator for
each material Aspect of an organization’s operations; while “comprehensive”
reporting requires a generic DMA and use of all indicators that GRI has identified
for each material aspect. While organizations are encouraged to report on indicators
that give a comprehensive and balanced view of material aspects, there is no
enforcement mechanism to advance that normative suggestion. As a result, even
where companies are in the same sector, their reports cannot easily be compared.
One study comparing GRI reports in the automotive industry sought to
evaluate whether the information being produced by GRI reporters can be used in
the way GRI suggests—to affect organizations’ decisions, to promote sustainability
and to empower outside stakeholders—and concluded as follows:
In sum, our brief analysis of actual GRI reports suggests that even though
all [automotive] companies claim full coverage of the GHG indicators, the
information they provide is of limited practical use. A look at other
indicators confirms this finding. Thus, quantitative data are not always
gathered systematically and reported completely, while qualitative
information appears unbalanced and often fails to include a credible
assessment of the sustainability impacts of various measures taken by a
reporting organization. These findings are consistent with a GRI study on
human rights reporting, according to which only [seven] percent of all
reports examined complied with the information requirements of
quantitative human rights indicators.50
Other academic studies have observed similar problems with the
comparability of the information being reported.51
As also stated in its 2015 five-year strategic plan, an additional premise
underlying GRI’s sustainability reporting is that it “ensures organizations consider
their impacts on these sustainability issues . . . .”52 This claim has also been subjected
to academic analysis, and was found wanting. Thus, Markus Milne, Amanda Ball,
and Rob Gray, a pioneer in social accounting, surveyed the existing literature on

50. Klaus Dingwerth & Margot Eichinger, Tamed Transparency: How Information Disclosure under
the Global Reporting Initiative Fails to Empower, 10:3 GLOBAL ENV. POL. 74, 88 (2010), citing GLOBAL
REPORTING INITIATIVE AND ROBERTS ENVIRONMENT CENTER, REPORTING ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
A SURVEY CONDUCTED BY THE GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE AND THE ROBERTS
ENVIRONMENT CENTER, (Claremont McKenna College 2008).
51.
See, e.g., Levy, Brown, & de Jong, supra note 44; Carl-Johan Hedberg & Fredrik von
Malmborg, The Global Reporting Initiative and Corporate Sustainability Reporting in Swedish Companies, 10 CORP.
SOC. RESP. & ENVTL. MGMT. 153, 163 (2003).
52. See GRI, supra note 48.
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GRI as a preeminent example of triple bottom line reporting, and evaluated the
potential of GRI reports to promote actual sustainability. Their evaluation found
serious gaps.53 As summarized in their research from 2012-13:
The quality—and, especially, the completeness—of many TBL [triple bottom
line] reports are not high. Despite increased awareness, recent reporting
remains little better than that of the early European pioneers in the early
1990s. And with a few notable exceptions, the reports cover few
stakeholders, cherry pick elements of news and generally ignore the major
social issues that arise from corporate activity such as lobbying, advertising,
increased consumption, distributions of wealth and so on. The reports
often refer to “sustainability” and “sustainable development,” but virtually
unaddressed are issues of equity and social justice, and completely
unaddressed are issues of the scale of development, limits and constraints
to that development, and future generations: issues we identified in the
previous section [of this Article] as core to sustainability concerns.54
Milne, Ball and Gray concluded that “current efforts of environmental or
sustainability reporting are woefully inadequate means on which to form ideas about
‘success’ in terms of the ecological logic needed to reorganise and ‘control’
economic activity.”55 In fact, their conclusion is that triple bottom line reporting
may actually impede sustainability, because companies and possibly NGOs are
putting so much emphasis on reporting, which may amount “to little more than
soothing palliatives that, in fact, may be moving us towards greater levels of
unsustainability” by permitting business as usual.56
These negative assessments may suggest that GRI has not achieved very much,
a suggestion that is inaccurate. GRI at least has the ambition of promoting
systematic, useful sustainability reporting by emphasizing the disclosure of objective
facts about environmental, economic and social performance,57 rather than
encouraging soft statements about commitments and management approaches. As
a normative commitment, that is important, presumably having an influence on
other disclosure initiatives. As set out above, GRI standards are being reflected in
some domestic laws and stock exchange listing requirements, which suggests that
GRI’s technical expertise in developing useful ESG metrics is being recognized.
Moreover, its adoption by thousands of companies, including eighty-two percent of
the global 250 companies, shows that it is the benchmark voluntary standard for
ESG disclosure. Such diffusion at least suggests a realistic potential for continuous
improvement to advance GRI’s own strategic goals of greater comparability
53. Markus J. Milne, Amanda Ball & Rob Gray, Wither Ecology? The Triple Bottom Line, the Global
Reporting Initiative, and the Institutionalization of Corporate Sustainability Reporting, 188(1) J. BUS. ETHICS 1
(2013).
54. Id. at 9 (citation omitted).
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 17.
57.
See Peter M. Clarkson, Yue Li, Gordon D. Richardson & Florin P. Vasvari, Revisiting the
Relation Between Environmental Performance and Environmental Disclosure: An Empirical Analysis, 33 ACCT.,
ORGS. & SOC’Y 303, 309 (2008).
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between different companies’ sustainability analyses and greater depth of coverage
within companies. Yet, in order for GRI disclosure to ultimately to have a positive
effect on company action it must be true that companies manage what they measure,
not only for financial data but for ESG data as well. We now turn to that question.
III. DISCLOSURE STRATEGIES GENERALLY
With respect to ESG disclosure, significant questions remain about the
accuracy of the oft-repeated maxim that “you manage what you measure.” With
financial disclosure, such as results of operations, or earnings per share, tens of
thousands of securities analysts and tens of thousands of security firms’ computers
stand ready to absorb the information when it is disclosed, use it in calculations and
algorithms, and make decisions about buying, selling, holding, hedging, limiting,
splitting, aggregating and generally transacting in securities and derivatives on the
basis of the information. Thus, as we know, companies do manage what they
measure, sometimes even making decisions to sacrifice longer-term, net positive
present value transactions in order to show current quarter financial results in line
with analysts’ expectations,58 referred to as “earnings management.” US academic
research has found that pressure on corporate managers to deliver short-term
investment results has become so strong that nearly eighty percent of chief financial
officers report they would sacrifice future economic value to manage short-term
earnings so as to meet investor expectations.59
Moreover, much of this financial disclosure in the U.S. is required by Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations. Companies cannot leave out bad
news, as they can with voluntary ESG disclosure, and so attention gets paid to
managing bad financial news. Even where not legally required, such as some
forward-looking statements and financial projections, pressures by market
participants for financial projections and other future-looking information make
issuing such statements a strongly-observed norm by close to all companies
reporting in the U.S. and trading on its exchanges.
But what evidence is there that ESG disclosure has a similar external effect,
sending thousands of analysts and computers into action, and thus a similarly
powerful internal effect on managers’ time and attention? In short, what evidence
is there of the core corporate accountability premise that collecting, analyzing, and
disclosing greater ESG information will cause managers to pay more attention to
these matters, that they will “manage what they measure?”
58. For a concise discussion of concerns about this phenomenon, see CLAIRE A. HILL & BRETT
H. MCDONNELL, SHORT AND LONG TERM INVESTORS (AND OTHER STAKEHOLDERS TOO): MUST
(AND DO) THEIR INTERESTS CONFLICT?, (U. Mn. Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 15-37 2015), http://www
.ssrn.com/abstract=2699324.
59.
John Graham, Campbell Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, Value Destruction and Financial
Reporting Decisions, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS’ J. 27, 27-29 (2006), http://ssrn.com/abstract=871215 (finding
that some of the actions that these managers say they would take to meet analysts’ expectations include
delaying long-term investments, reducing research and development expenditures, or eliminating
planned marketing campaigns).
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The answer, so far as this author can determine, is that there are very few
empirical studies of the accuracy of that premise. Empirical papers showing
important external, financial effects of corporate sustainability initiatives (such as
lower costs of capital, higher valuations, and lower stock-price volatility) are
abundant, and many of those studies evaluate companies’ commitments to
sustainability through their disclosure.60 Thus, empirical papers about investors’
reactions to expanded ESG disclosure are readily available.61 Given that financial
markets do react to companies’ ESG disclosure, there is reason to believe that some
companies might well manage what they measure in this realm, and might
particularly start to do so in regions such as the EU where mandatory ESG
disclosure requirements are coming on-line.62
Regarding the internal effects of voluntary ESG disclosure, though, this author
could find few empirical papers. Academic pioneers publish case studies about the
potential for positive internal effects of expanded disclosure,63 as do accounting
firms that have a business interest in promoting expanded disclosure, such as
KPMG.64 There is some evidence that firms with better environmental performance
disclose more environmental information, but that does not indicate that the
disclosure itself causes the better environmental performance.65 If anything, the
authors’ analysis seems to indicate that causation goes the other way, that is, better
environmental performers decide to disclose more, including emphasizing objective
60. An excellent overview of this literature is found in GORDON L. CLARK, ANDREAS FEINER
& MICHAEL VIEHS, FROM THE STOCKHOLDER TO THE STAKEHOLDER: HOW SUSTAINABILITY CAN
DRIVE FINANCIAL OUTPERFORMANCE (2015) (overview of empirical studies investigating the
relationships between corporate sustainability initiatives and better financial performance, lower stock
market volatility, higher valuations, lower costs of capital, and so forth).
61. See id.
62.
See Jody Grewal, Edward J. Riedl & George Serafeim, Market Reactions to Mandatory
Nonfinancial Disclosure (Sept. 9, 2015), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2657712. That paper reviews
prior findings about the external effects of disclosure, and also identifies three studies of the operational
(internal) effects of mandatory disclosure, which papers are discussed below. The paper’s main
contribution is to evaluate the equity market reaction to the EU’s new (as of 2014) mandatory ESG
disclosure requirements, and finds, in general, a statistically significant negative reaction, which is more
pronounced with respect to companies that did not engage in ESG disclosure prior to the requirement
coming into effect. The authors interpret the generally negative market reaction to be an expression of
investors’ views that the cost of complying with the new disclosure obligations outweigh the benefit of
the new information that will be brought to the market.
63.
Two such expanded disclosure pioneers are Bob Eccles, until recently a professor at
Harvard Business School, and Allen White, co-founder of the GRI. See ROBERT G. ECCLES &
MICHAEL P. KRZUS, INTEGRATED REPORTING FOR A SUSTAINABLE STRATEGY (John Wiley & Sons
2010); Allen L. White, New Wine, New Bottles: The Rise of Non-Financial Reporting, A Business Brief by Business
for Social Responsibility, June 20, 2005, http://www.businesswire.com/portal/binary/com.epicentric
.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/services/ir_and_pr/ir_resource_center/editorial
s/2005/BSR.pdf.
64.
See, e.g., https://home.kpmg.com/xx/en/home/insights/2013/04/integrated-reporting
.html (discussing Integrated Reporting initiative) (last visited Jan. 21, 2016).
65.
See Clarkson, Li, Richardson & Vasvari, supra note 57, 319-20 (using voluntary
environmental disclosure and evaluating environmental performance using Toxic Release Inventory
data, finding a statistically significant positive relationship between superior environmental performance
and more environmental disclosure of facts about a company’s record).
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facts about their performance (such as percentages of toxic releases per dollar of
profit).66
This author could find little empirical testing of the underlying accountability
premise that collecting, collating and disclosing ESG information itself causes
important changes within companies, such that those companies start to improve
their ESG performance. One recent article discussing the internal, transformative
effects thought to be associated with greater information collection and disclosure
was Eccles and Serafeim’s Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional Perspective,
which discusses both the external “information function” of ESG disclosure, and
the internal “transformative function.”67 That article discusses the relatively new
(since 2002) integrated reporting concept, <IR>, which incorporates financial and
ESG reporting into one report using a framework evaluating the six types of capital
every company uses to create value, those being financial, manufactured, natural,
intellectual, human, and social and relationship capital. While the article discusses
the transformative potential within the firm from the cross-functional
collaborations and “joined-up thinking” necessary to produce an integrated report,
the authors concluded (in 2014) that:
While it is clearly too soon to claim that many companies and investors are
reaping the information and transformation benefits of integrated
reporting, that is clearly the intent of companies that are its early
practitioners, people who have written on the subject, and the new <IR>
framework.68
Eccles and Serafeim then use a case study approach to compare two
companies’ integrated reports, focusing on the external, informational function of
the reports.69 Ultimately the article concludes that without a mandatory regulatory
framework monitoring and enforcing regulatory standards to ensure accuracy,
comparability and reliability, integrated reporting, like sustainability reporting
generally, will be limited in its usefulness.70
It could be that this author’s inability to find quantitative empirical work
evaluating the maxim “you manage what you measure” in the ESG context is simply
a function of inadequate research skills, although the author’s informal efforts to
research the topic have also failed.71 At the least, one can reasonably conclude that
66. See id.
67.
Robert G. Eccles & George Serafeim, Corporate and Integrated Reporting: A Functional
Perspective, in CORPORATE STEWARDSHIP: ACHIEVING SUSTAINABLE EFFECTIVENESS (Susan Albers
Mohrman, James O’Toole &Edward E. Lawler III eds., Greenleaf Publishing 2015), http://www.ssrn
.com/abstract=2388716.
68. Id. at 12. This author is among the “people who have written on the subject,” as is Bob
Eccles himself. See Eccles & Krzus, supra note 63; Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, The Social
Reform of Banking, 39(3) J. CORP. L. 459 (2014).
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 18.
71. The author is a member of various listservs related to sustainability, sustainable financial
markets, and socially responsible investment, and sent queries to those lists after being unable to find
empirical studies. The author also sent queries to researchers known to be interested in the topic of
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there is not a lot of quantitative empirical work testing the premise in the ESG
context. As Delmas and Lessem have stated in 2014 regarding environmental
disclosure policies, “[d]espite the popularity of environmental information policies,
we still have little understanding of their effectiveness.”72 Certainly there is not a
readily available body of evidence showing that companies are making significant
improvements in their social and environmental performance because they have
been engaging in voluntary ESG disclosure pursuant to GRI or any other
framework.
IV. MANDATORY REGIMES AND THE POWER OF LEGALITY
A. Disclosure Regimes
It may be that the problem with finding powerful indicators of internal
transformation from ESG disclosure is thus that most of the regimes are still
voluntary. Although disclosure frameworks like the GRI request that companies
provide a balanced view of company results, companies can choose whether to
engage in the ESG disclosure project, when to disclose, what to disclose, whether
to discuss negative facts, trends, or data, what to emphasize, and what to ignore. A
number of studies of specific, mandatory non-financial disclosure regimes have found
operational effects. For instance, Bennear and Olmstead found that required
disclosure to water customers in Massachusetts of companies’ water quality results
and violations of safety standards produced between a thirty- and forty-four-percent
reduction in violations by large companies, and a reduction in severe violations of
between forty- and fifty-seven-percent.73 Similarly, Jin and Leslie found that when
restaurants in Los Angeles County were required to post their health and hygiene
inspection results in the window of the restaurant, subsequent health inspection
scores increased by about five percent, the revenue of restaurants with an “A” grade
was about five percent higher than those with a B, and the number of food-borne
hospitalizations in the area decreased by twenty percent, which the authors
interpreted as showing that restaurants were making quality improvements.74 The
Toxic Release Inventory, which requires companies to disclose releases to air,
ground and water of identified toxins, has been credited with substantial reductions

ESG disclosure. There were no quantitative empirical studies of the “internal transformative effects”
of expanded disclosure brought to the author’s attention through these methods, although there were
many studies showing external effects brought to the author’s attention.
72.
Magali A. Delmas & Neil Lessem, Saving power to conserve your reputation? The effectiveness of
private versus public information, 67 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 353, 354 (2014) (providing individual
feedback to college students on their energy use in their dorms had no effect on reducing energy use
until the results of each room’s energy use were publicly posted, at which point high-energy users
reduced their energy use by 20%).
73.
See Lori S. Bennear & Sheila M. Olmstead, The Impacts of the “Right to Know”: Information
Disclosure and the Violation of Drinking Water Standards, 56 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 117, 129 (2008).
74. See Ginger Zhe Jin & Phillip Leslie, The Effect of Information on Product Quality: Evidence from
Restaurant Hygiene Grade Cards, 118(2) Q.J. ECON. 409, 410 (2003).
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in toxic emissions from industrial plants,75 although questions remain about the
accuracy of those reported reductions.76 And a recent study of required mine safety
disclosure enacted as part of Dodd-Frank showed a decrease in mining related
citations of eleven percent and a decrease in mining injuries of thirteen percent as a
result of the disclosure, an effect on company operations mediated through the
stock market.77
Thus, what evidence there is of the power of non-financial disclosure is
consistent with what we’ve seen in the financial disclosure arena: to have operational
effects, disclosure must be mandatory (so that disclosers cannot be selective in what
they disclose), specific, and targeted to clearly identified users. As with any
regulatory regime, a disclosure regime needs to be well-designed (have intelligent
metrics and proper scope), and be backed by well-resourced monitoring and
enforcement in order to advance its underlying regulatory goals.78 Analysis by Fung,
Graham and Weil of eight different mandatory transparency regimes concluded that
to be highly effective in advancing the goals of the regime, the regime needs to
become “doubly embedded,”79 by which they mean producing information that is
valuable, comprehensible and useful to users of the information, which then cause
shifts in user behavior, which then produces shifts in disclosers’ behavior.80
Applying that analysis suggests that expanded ESG disclosure has some distance to
go to become broadly effective in altering corporate behavior: it must become
mandatory, and then specific users such as investors or regulators must alter their
behavior in ways that companies perceive as tied to the information being disclosed
so that market or policy signals are amplified. This evaluation is also consistent with
what Levy, Brown and de Jong concluded was one of the reasons that GRI has
“stalled:” that “[t]here is widespread agreement that non-financial reports are rarely
studied in any detail.”81
75. See MARY GRAHAM, DEMOCRACY BY DISCLOSURE: THE RISE OF TECHNOPOPULISM 17
(Brookings Institution Press 2002) (TRI “recognized as one of the nation’s most successful
environmental regulation and was widely credited with encouraging target companies to cut toxic
release by nearly 50 percent in ten years.”).
76.
See ARCHON FUNG, MARY GRAHAM & DAVID WEIL, FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS
AND PROMISE OF TRANSPARENCY 86 (Cambridge University Press 2008) (noting concerns with
inaccurate data, possibilities that some reductions were an artifact of differences in reporting
procedures).
77.
See Hans B. Christensen, Eric Floyd, Lisa Yao Liu & Mark Maffett, The Real Effects of
Mandatory Dissemination of Non-Financial Information Through Financial Reports, at 3, http://www.ssrn.com
/abstract=2680296 (last visited Apr. 19, 2016).
78. See GRAHAM, supra note 75, at 5.
79. FUNG, GRAHAM & WEIL, supra note 76, at 68.
80. See id. at 62-66. By that analysis, Fung et. al. concluded that corporate financial disclosure
by publicly-traded companies, restaurant hygiene disclosure in Los Angeles, and the Community
Reinvestment Act disclosure of mortgage rates according to race, gender and income are highly effective
disclosure regimes, all having produced information that is useful to the relevant users, and those users
of the information having changed their behavior, thus producing incentives for the reporters to change
their behavior. Id. at 82-84.
81. Levy, Brown & de Jong, supra note 44, at 22. Other reasons the authors discuss for GRI’s
current “stall,” based on qualitative research, is that the business case for expanded ESG disclosure,
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B. Transnational Corporate Responsibility Regimes
Broadening the focus of analysis from voluntary, transnational transparency
regimes to voluntary transnational corporate social responsibility (CSR) regimes
generally, of which ESG disclosure is a sub-set and key mechanism, we see a
bewildering proliferation of voluntary initiatives that seek to set substantive
standards and that are, in many instances, shaping norms of responsible corporate
behavior. This CSR proliferation is one example of the regulatory terrain that has
produced what Shaffer aptly calls “a jungle” of literature82 describing, theorizing
and empirically examining these different transnational regulatory approaches.83 In
the CSR terrain alone we observe, broadly speaking, public regulatory networks,
public/private co-regulation, industry self-regulation, NGO collaborative
regulation, and multi-lateral and multi-sectoral regulation.84 Organizations such as
the Corporate Responsibility Association and the Corporate Social Responsibility
Officers Association have been established to professionalize the role of corporate
responsibility managers and to provide networks of such individuals across
companies and industries,85 and businesses that produce conferences, websites and
magazines to promote the corporate responsibility trend have proliferated.86
Over the last two decades, scholarship on these new forms of regulation has
also proliferated, understandably, given the fascination of the new, under such
names as “new governance,” “global administrative law,” “soft law,” “reflexive
law,” “responsive regulation,” and so on.87 As Professor Orly Lobel discussed in an
that it would lead to material financial benefits, which had been emphasized by GRI to produce
corporate take-up, has not been substantiated in businesses’ experience (id. at 21-22); participation by
labor, NGOs and financial analysts in GRI has either declined (labor and NGOs) or failed to materialize
(financial analysts) (id. at 23-24); and socially-responsible investment firms, which might be expected to
be the primary users of GRI reports, have developed their own, proprietary data-bases of information
that is more specific and useful than that produced by GIR reports (id. at 24-26). Thus, the authors
conclude, “[t]he stakeholders who have derived the most tangible economic benefits from non-financial
reporting are the auditors, consultants and certifiers of corporate social performance reports.” Id. at 26.
82.
Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 2
(forthcoming 2016).
83. Peer Zumbansen does a masterful job of summarizing and analyzing that literature. See Peer
Zumbansen, Where the Wild Things Are: Transnational Legal Ordering, the Public/Private Distinction and the
Western Legal Imagination (2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2723990,
(particularly 13-14 for a summary of some of the different frameworks that have been used to try to
understand the proliferation of hybrid public/private regimes).
84. For a description of some of the most prominent transnational regulatory initiatives in the
corporate responsibility field, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N.
Gordon & Georg Ringe, eds.) (forthcoming 2016).
85.
See Corporate Responsibility Association at www.corporateresponsibilityassociation.org
and Corporate Responsibility Officers Association at www.croassociation.org.
86.
For an early, qualitative research report on this trend see John M. Conley & Cynthia A.
Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish: The Theory and Practice of Corporate Social Responsibility, 31 J. CORP.
L. 1 (2005).
87.
For an overview of the literature, including sources for these and other terms for new
regulatory forms, see Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 262 (2004).
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insightful early analysis, these regulatory forms have been based upon participation
and partnership between public and private entities; collaboration among multistakeholder groups; diversity and competition between regulatory regimes; better
integration of related policy domains; and the potential for regulatory and quasiregulatory flexibility, adaptability and dynamic learning.88
And yet, scholarly fascination with these new, often voluntary, and certainly
softer transnational regulatory forms may have allowed our collective attention to
be diverted while old school, so-called “command and control”, domestic hard law89
has started to be systematically undermined by the expansion since the 1990s of
large parts of the world covered by bilateral investment treaties (BITs) that include
compulsory investor-state arbitration provisions.90 Of particular concern, investorstate arbitration clauses are also included in current versions of treaties such as the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and Trans-Pacific Trade
Treaties being negotiated in Spring of 2016 as this essay is being written. By virtue
of these provisions, as they’ve been interpreted by private arbitrators, any investor,
typically a multi-national enterprise, can challenge in private arbitration any
legislation, regulation or even court decision that the investor can argue has
undermined its future profits, without the possibility of public judicial review.91 As
leading scholar Professor Gus van Harten has written, these BITs and other treaties
such as NAFTA give private arbitrators the power to “decide upon the permissible
scope of public powers to tax businesses, deliver public services, establish regulatory
standards, control land use, and so on.”92 The potential for this litigation may also
give governments pause when new regulations are being considered, as uncovered
by Professors Van Harten and Scott in qualitative research on the regulatory
processes in Ontario’s trade and environment ministries.93 That local regulators take
the potential for investor/state arbitration into account when considering new
88. Id.
89. The term “command and control” as used to describe old governance forms of law often
has a demeaning quality about it, in this author’s view, as the term is frequently used at least implicitly
in a critical sense, and in contrast to the presumably more flexible, pragmatic forms of new governance.
As argued by Joel Bakan, this argumentative contrast can make invisible both the ways in which
corporations use “old governance” to advance their private interests, and can also conceptually
undermine the importance of “command and control” approaches to advance the public interest and
(sometimes) limit the harms private actors can cause. See Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private
Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 279 (2015) (arguing that transnational private
regulatory regimes cannot properly be understood as responding to a lack of domestic legal capacity in
light of globalization, given the various ways in which corporations use domestic law to further their
economic interests).
90. See VAN HARTEN, SOVEREIGN CHOICES, supra note 15 for a thorough discussion of this
problem. For a short introduction showing the expansion of investor-state arbitrations since the 1990s,
see Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15.
91. See Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15, at 612-13.
92. Id. at 608.
93.
See Gus Van Harten & Dayna Nadine Scott, Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of
Regulatory Proposals: A Case Study from Canada, http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2700238 (describing
results of interview-based study of how regulators within Ontario’s trade and environment ministries
think about potential trade and ISDS litigation when considering new regulations).
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regulations suggests that investor/state dispute settlement procedures also
constitute an emerging transnational legal order (“TLO”)—one that involves
contestation at local and state levels, and one that is having effects on local, state
and national laws and institutions.
The scope of the investor/state arbitration system as an emerging TLO bears
further elaboration. Its most problematic implication is that public, sovereign
processes that seek to assert some social control over market forces, including by
improving labor conditions, raising minimum wages, protecting consumers or
addressing environmental problems, can be challenged by any company (“investor”
in the treaties’ terms) in any country that has a BIT that generally consents to
investor-state compulsory arbitration. Today there are over 2,800 BITs in place, the
first having been signed by Turkey and Germany in 1959; but it is only since the late
1990s that companies have started aggressively to use these treaty provisions to
challenge state actions around the world.94 It is estimated that there are now fourhundred active arbitrations on-going.95
Two examples of this litigation will illustrate some concerns with these
challenges to state regulatory authority. Because of the problems in nuclear power
plants in Fukushima, Japan, after the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, Germany
closed its oldest nuclear plants immediately, as part of a comprehensive plan to
phase out nuclear power between 2011 and 2020. This decision by the German
government had the effect of closing even those plants it had in 2010 agreed to
allow to have an “extended lifetime” beyond what had been the projected (and
designed) end of operation for those plants. A Swedish energy company, Vattenfall,
and its German subsidiary, sued Germany in 2012 for €3.7 billion using the investorstate dispute settlement (ISDS) procedure because two of Vattenfall’s oldest plants
were shut down as a result of this decision—even though one of those plants
(Krummel) had not been in operation since 2007, given safety concerns, and even
though Vattenfall’s own financial statements in 2011 had estimated its losses as €1.1
billion in reaction to the German government’s decision.96 Another recent example
is TransCanada’s lawsuit against the U.S. for $15 billion in reaction to the Obama
administration’s decision not to give a permit to the Keystone XL pipeline, which
would have carried oil from the Canadian tar-sands to Nebraska, in order to connect
to a pipeline to Louisiana for refining and shipment overseas.97
Whether Vatenfall’s or TransCanada’s particular action is right or wrong, or
the damages claim inflated or not, is not a question this author has a particularly
94. See Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder & Rhea Tamara Hoffman, The German Nuclear Phase
Out Put to the Test in International Investment Arbitration?, 2 (2013), https://www.tni.org/files
/download/vattenfall-icsid-case_oct2013.pdf. See also Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15, at
609-10 (data on increasing numbers of investor-state arbitrations since the late 1990s).
95. See Benasconi-Osterwalder & Hoffman, supra note 94.
96. See id.
97. See Rebecca Penty, TransCanada Fights Keystone Denial with $15 Billion Appeal, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS, Jan. 6, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-06/transcanada-files
-suit-over-keystone-xl-will-take-writedown.
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well-informed view upon. It is necessary for companies making long-term
investments in infrastructure to have protections against rapid changes in the
political environment that can rightly be called “expropriation” or “unfair or
discriminatory treatment,” and those are the protections the BITs are meant to
provide. Yet, it has been argued that the concepts of “expropriation” and “unfair
or discriminatory treatment” have been interpreted far too broadly by many of the
private arbitrators,98 and that the countervailing public interests in the challenged
regulations interpreted too narrowly, undermining domestic regulatory capacity.
Certainly TransCanada’s argument that the Keystone XL denial was based on
“political” reasons and not the merits of the application99 supports the view that
these investment treaties can undermine domestic, sovereign legal capacity. It
should be unproblematic for countries to make decisions for political reasons such
as to advance environmental values or to meet the country’s climate change
commitments made in international agreements, both of which the Obama
administration articulated as rationales for its rejection of the Keystone XL.100
The concern that the investor/state arbitration system undermines democratic
values of rule of law, transparency and accountability has not only been discussed
by academics and NGOs, but has been examined within global policy fora such as
the U.N.’s Human Rights Council and the Council of Europe. In a 2015 report to
the U.N. Human Rights Council, an Independent Expert given a mandate to study
the matter, Professor Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, stated that “[m]any observers have
expressed concern about certain investor–State dispute settlement arbitrations that
have effectively overridden the State’s fulfilment of its function to regulate domestic
labour, health and environmental policies, and have had adverse human rights
impacts, also on third parties, including a ‘chilling effect’ with regard to the exercise
of democratic governance.”101 Ultimately the Independent Expert concluded that
these concerns are well-founded, indeed that the situation presents an
“extraordinary problem,”102 and he proposed that the validity of BITs and freetrade agreements should be tested under the rules of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties,103 and under states’ Constitutions,104 with an expectation that they
would not be upheld. As he concluded about the latter point, it is unlikely under the
Constitutions of most states that a state can “waive its ontological function to
legislate in the public interest.”105 Professor de Zayas gave similar testimony in 2016
to a Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights of the

98. See Van Harten, Private Authority, supra note 15, at 27.
99. Penty, supra note 97.
100. See id.
101. Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Report of the Independent Expert on the promotion of a democratic and
equitable international order, Human Rights Council, A/HRC/30/44 (14 July 2015), ¶ 5, http://ohchr.org
/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session30/Pages/ListReports.aspx.
102. Id. ¶ 41.
103. Id. ¶ 42
104. Id. ¶ 44.
105. Id.
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Council of Europe, which is examining investor/state dispute settlement
procedures for a report to be issued in 2017.106
What is worth emphasizing at a general level is that Shaffer and Halliday’s
framework of transnational legal orders brings attention to a key issue: how do
particular transnational frameworks “touch down” in legal processes, contracts, or
proceedings, which by definition will involve local specification and an attention to
hard law and legal power; and what are the conflicts and contestations that the
transnational regime engenders in the process? As they state the point, “key to the
TLO framework is ‘the production of order, or, in our terms, the normative settlement
of law,” a process that involves “the institutionalization of a TLO, which occurs multidirectionally and recursively up from and down to the national and local levels.”107
It is thus both a theoretical and analytic framework, but also a call for empirical
evidence that can be brought to bear to understand, among many other questions,
the interaction of specific transnational regulatory regimes and domestic (or even
municipal) law in specific instances.
In the corporate responsibility context, private, voluntary, soft law regimes are
proliferating, in many heterogeneous forms. A recent report commissioned by one
of the EU’s largest conservation organizations, the Royal Society for the Protection
of Birds, suggests that most (eighty-two percent) of the 161 voluntary regimes it
surveyed are not effective, though, either not being ambitious enough, not achieving
their ambitions, even if ambitious, or not having enough industry take-up to make
a serious difference.108 This finding is provocative, but invites systematic evaluation
of how individual trans-regulatory initiatives fare, and under what conditions might
we expect such CSR regimes to be effective.109 Shaffer and Halliday’s work suggests
individual regimes need to be the focus of analysis, and in specific, focuses analysis
on how such regimes “touch down.” Which CSR regimes, if any, are powerfully
effective in shaping company behavior? Which, if any, are ambitious enough to meet
the policy challenges that gave rise to the regime, that achieve their ambition, and
that have substantial industry take-up? And if such individual initiatives do exist,
this author would add that it is important to evaluate whether there are collisions
106.
See Press Release, U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, Investor-State
Dispute Settlement Undermines Rule of Law and Democracy, U.N. Expert Tells Council of Europe, (Apr. 19, 2016),
http://ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=19839&LangID=E.
107. TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 13, at 5.
108. See D. McCarthy & P. Morling, Using Regulation as a Last Resort? Assessing the Performance of
Voluntary Approaches, ROYAL SOCIETY FOR THE PROTECTION OF BIRDS (2015), https://www.rspb.org
.uk/Images/usingregulation_tcm9-408677.pdf.
109. There is some excellent empirical work on individual regimes, but there needs to be much
more, including evaluations of effectiveness. See, e.g., Colin Scott, Fabrizio Cafaggi & Linda Senden,
eds., The Challenge of Transnational Private Regulation: Conceptual and Constitutional Debates, 38(1) J.L. & SOC’Y
1 (2011) (introducing empirical studies of regimes in food, security, and finance, and including
evaluations of legitimacy, enforcement, and efficacy); Erroll Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global
Private-Public Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006) (discussing Forest Stewardship
Council in forestry); Tim Bartley, Institutional Emergence in an Era of Globalization: The Rise of Transnational
Private Regulation of Labor and Environmental Conditions, 113 AM. J. SOC. 297 (2007) (discussing supply
chains and private regulation).
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between the apparent progress being achieved by the regime, and challenges in the
same field to domestic regulation enabled by investor-state dispute settlement
processes, which is itself a rapidly-developing TLO providing legal protections for
investors.
The context of looking at “collisions” needs both a global and local focus,
since investor-state dispute procedures are not the only way in which some
companies are undermining domestic law. Professor John Coates has collected data
showing that half of First Amendment cases in the United States today are used to
defend corporate interests and deflect regulation, particularly required disclosure,
which trend in the case law, he concludes, shows that “in aggregate, [these cases]
degrade the rule of law, rendering it less predictable, general and clear. This
corruption risks significant economic harms in addition to [risking] the loss of a
republican form of government.”110 Nor is the “collision” between transnational
private regulation and investor-state dispute settlement procedures the only way
private regulation has been incompletely understood. As Professor Joel Bakan
argues, transnational private regulatory regimes cannot fully be understood as
responding to a lack of domestic legal capacity in light of globalization, as they are
often conceptualized, given the various ways in which corporations use domestic
law to further their economic interests.111 In other words, Professor Bakan argues,
it is not a lack of domestic legal capacity that gives rise to lacunae that private
transnational regimes address, but rather decisions by domestic legislators not to
use their legislative powers in robust fashion to address human rights, consumer
protection, environmental concerns, or labor rights in an extraterritorial context that
give rise to a need for private transnational regimes.
V. CONCLUSION
As set out in the Introduction, my view is that the academic attention that has
been paid to transnational, private, social and environmental CSR regimes
(including in my own work) has been understandable and possibly even necessary:
after all, this is one of the important regulatory developments that we see intensified
by the processes of financialization and continuing globalization. Yet our attention
to these developments has likely deflected adequate attention from the powerful
ways transnational corporations are undermining and challenging domestic laws
that seek to advance social and environmental goals similar to those of many of the
transnational regimes we study and even celebrate.
What Shaffer and Halliday have done is provide a clear, empirically informed
framework for evaluating and understanding these collisions of regimes. Which
110. John C. Coates, IV, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: History, Data and Implications,
30 CONST. COMMENT. 223, 223 (2015).
111. See Joel Bakan, The Invisible Hand of Law: Private Regulation and the Rule of Law, 48 Cornell
Int’l L.J. 279 (2015). See also Ronen Shamir, Socially Responsible Private Regulation: World-Culture or WorldCapitalism?, 45 L. & SOC. REV. 313 (2011) (challenging the view that CSR is a response to a lack of legal
capacity, but rather arguing that it is a business-created mechanism to deflect regulation).
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norms, really, have settled where, in which legal processes, and why? Looking at the
investor-state dispute settlement processes, being heard by private arbitrators, often
in the World Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(ICSID), with little to no public transparency, accountability or public participation,
versus the world of CSR, suggests that in many cases the settled norms are not those
of transnational corporate responsibility and expanded ESG disclosure. But it is not
at a general level that the next investigations should occur; rather, it is regime by
regime, country by country, litigation by litigation. Shaffer and Halliday and their
contributing authors have shown how this can be done in their excellent book
Transnational Legal Orders, challenging those of us interested in CSR and regulatory
theory to do the same.
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